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Abstract
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are susceptible to model
stealing attacks, which allows a data-limited adversary with
no knowledge of the training dataset to clone the function-
ality of a target model, just by using black-box query ac-
cess. Such attacks are typically carried out by querying
the target model using inputs that are synthetically gener-
ated or sampled from a surrogate dataset to construct a la-
beled dataset. The adversary can use this labeled dataset
to train a clone model, which achieves a classification ac-
curacy comparable to that of the target model. We propose
“Adaptive Misinformation” to defend against such model
stealing attacks. We identify that all existing model steal-
ing attacks invariably query the target model with Out-Of-
Distribution (OOD) inputs. By selectively sending incorrect
predictions for OOD queries, our defense substantially de-
grades the accuracy of the attacker’s clone model (by up to
40%), while minimally impacting the accuracy (< 0.5%)
for benign users. Compared to existing defenses, our de-
fense has a significantly better security vs accuracy trade-
off and incurs minimal computational overhead.
1. Introduction
The ability of Deep Learning models to solve several
challenging classification problems in fields like computer
vision and natural language processing has proliferated the
use of these models in various products and services such as
smart cameras, intelligent voice assistants and self-driving
cars. In addition, several companies now employ deep
learning models to offer classification as a service to end
users who may not have the resources to train their own
models. In most of these cases, while the model parameters
and the architecture are kept hidden from the end-user, the
user is allowed to interact with the model to obtain the clas-
sification outputs for the user’s inputs. The confidentiality
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Figure 1. Model Stealing Attack: (a) An adversary queries the tar-
get model (dog-breed classifier) using synthetic/surrogate data (cat
images) and constructs a labeled dataset using the predictions of
the model (b) The labeled dataset can then be used to train a clone-
model that replicates the functionality of the target model.
of these models is important as the models can be misused
in various ways in the hands of an adversary. For instance,
an adversary can use the stolen model to offer a compet-
ing service which can be detrimental to business. Further-
more, stolen models can be used to craft adversarial exam-
ples [20, 5, 17, 22], creating vulnerability for safety-critical
applications such as malware detection and can even leak
information about the data used to train the model, causing
privacy issues [4, 19]. These issues create a need to protect
the confidentiality of machine learning models.
Unfortunately, recent attacks [15, 17] have shown that
it is possible for an adversary to carry out model stealing
attacks and train a clone model that achieves a classifica-
tion accuracy that is remarkably close to the accuracy of the
target model (up to 0.99×). Moreover, these attacks can
be performed even when the adversary is constrained in the
following ways:
1. The adversary only has black-box query access to the
model i.e. the attacker can query the model with any input
and observe the output probabilities.
2. The adversary is data-limited and does not have ac-
cess to a large number of inputs representative of the train-
ing data of the target model.
Attacks that work under these constraints rely on one of
1
ar
X
iv
:1
91
1.
07
10
0v
1 
 [s
tat
.M
L]
  1
6 N
ov
 20
19
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Maximum Softmax Probability
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 D
at
a
CDF of MSP for Queries on ResNet-18 (CIFAR-10)
Benign
KnockoffNet
JBDA
Figure 2. CDF of Maximum Softmax Probability (MSP) for
queries from: (a) Benign User (b) KnockoffNet Attacker (c)
Jacobian-Based Dataset Augmentation (JBDA) Attacker. Queries
from benign user produce high values of MSP indicating in-
distribution data while queries generated from attacks produce low
values of MSP indicating out-of-distribution data.
two methods for generating the data necessary for query-
ing the target model: (a) Synthetic Data: [9, 17] produce
synthetic data from a small set of in-distribution seed ex-
amples by iteratively adding heuristic-based perturbations
to the seed examples. (b) Surrogate Data: Several attacks
[15, 21] simply use a surrogate dataset to query the target
model. For example, a cat dataset can be used as the sur-
rogate dataset to query the dog-breed classifier as shown in
Fig 1a. A labeled dataset can be constructed from these
queries, which can be used by the adversary to train a clone
model that mimics the functionality of the target model
(Fig 1b). Such attacks make it viable for an adversary to
create a clone of the target model even with limited/no ac-
cess to the target model’s data distribution. The goal of this
paper is to propose an effective defense for model stealing
attacks carried out by a data-limited adversary with black-
box access to the target model.
We observe that all existing attacks invariably generate
Out-Of-Distribution (OOD) queries. One way to check if
the data is OOD is by plotting the Maximum Softmax Prob-
ability (MSP) of the data produced by the target model.
High values of MSP indicate In-Distribution (ID) data and
low values indicate OOD data [6]. As an example, we char-
acterize the MSP values using a ResNet-18 network trained
on the CIFAR-10 dataset. We plot the CDF of MSP for be-
nign queries sampled from a held-out test set as well as ad-
versarial queries from two representative attacks: 1. Knock-
offnets [15], using surrogate data from CIFAR-100 dataset
and 2. Jacobian-Based Data Augmentation (JBDA) [17],
which uses synthetic data, in Fig 2. Notice that the CDFs
of the queries from both attacks are concentrated towards
lower values of MSP, indicating OOD data, compared to
the inputs from the benign user which produce high MSP
values, implying that the inputs are ID.
Motivated by this observation, we propose Adaptive Mis-
information (AM) to defend against model stealing attacks.
AM selectively sends incorrect predictions for queries that
are deemed OOD, while ID queries are serviced with cor-
rect predictions. Since a large fraction of the adversary’s
queries is OOD, this leads to the mislabeling of a signifi-
cant portion of the adversary’s dataset. Training a model on
this mislabeled dataset results in a low-quality clone with
poor accuracy, reducing the effectiveness of model stealing
attacks. Recent works [12, 16] have used a similar insight of
misleading the adversary, by injecting perturbations to the
predictions of the model. Compared to these perturbation
based defenses, our proposal is more scalable and offers a
significantly better trade-off between model accuracy and
security due to the following key attributes:
1. Adaptive Nature: The adaptive nature of our defense
allows using incorrect predictions to selectively service sus-
picious OOD queries, instead of indiscriminately adding
perturbations to the probabilities for all inputs. This results
in a better trade-off between model accuracy and security
against model stealing attacks.
2. Reduced Correlation through Misinformation: Prior
works add perturbations to the original prediction in order
to mislead the adversary. However, we find that these per-
turbed predictions remain correlated with the original pre-
dictions, leaking information about the original predictions
of the model. In contrast, our defense uses an uncorrelated
misinformation function to generate incorrect predictions,
which reveals no information about the original predictions,
resulting in better security.
3. Low Computational Overhead: Our proposal only re-
quires a single inference pass with a modest increase in the
amount of computation over an undefended model (< 2×).
In contrast, existing defenses like Prediction Poisoning [16]
(PP) requires multiple gradient computations and thus in-
curs several orders of magnitude increase in computational
cost and inference latency.
Overall, the contributions of our paper are as follows:
1. We analyze the queries from existing model stealing
attacks (KnockoffNets and JBDA) and identify that these at-
tacks produce a large number of OOD queries. We leverage
this observation to develop an effective defense.
2. We propose Adaptive Misinformation to defend
against model stealing attacks. Our defense involves us-
ing an out of distribution detector to flag “suspicious” in-
puts, potentially from an adversary, and adaptively servic-
ing these queries with incorrect predictions from an auxil-
iary “misinformation model” which produces uncorrelated
predictions
3. We perform extensive empirical studies to evaluate
our defense against multiple model stealing attacks. We plot
the security vs accuracy trade-off curve for various datasets
and show that, owing to its adaptive nature, our defense
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achieves a significantly better trade-off compared to prior
art. For instance, in the case of the Flowers-17 dataset, AM
lowers the clone model accuracy to 14.3%, compared to the
clone accuracy of 63.6% offered by PP with comparable de-
fender accuracy of 91%.
2. Problem Description
Our problem setting involves a data-limited adversary
who is trying to perform model stealing attack on a de-
fender’s model, just using black-box query access. In this
section, we outline the attack and defense objectives. We
also provide background on various attacks that have been
proposed in literature to perform model stealing for a data-
limited adversary.
2.1. Attack Objective
The adversary’s goal is to replicate the functionality of
the defender’s model f(x; θ) by training a clone model
f ′(x; θ′) that achieves high classification accuracy on the
defender’s classification task, as shown in Eqn. 1. Here,
Pdef (X) denotes the distribution of data from the de-
fender’s problem domain, θ represents the parameters of
the defender’s model, and θ′ represents the parameters of
the clone model that the attacker is trying to train.
max
θ′
E
x∼Pdef (X)
Acc(f ′(x; θ′)) (1)
If the adversary had access to a labeled dataset of inputs
sampled from Pdef (X), the adversary could simply use this
to train the clone-model f ′. However, in a lot of real-world
classification problems, the adversary is data-limited and
lacks access to a sufficiently large dataset that is represen-
tative of Pdef (X).
2.2. Model Stealing Attacks under data limitations
In the absence of a representative dataset, the adversary
can use either synthetic or surrogate data to query the de-
fender’s model. A labeled dataset can be constructed from
the predictions obtained through these queries, which can
be used to train the clone model f ′. These methods rely on
the principle of knowledge distillation [8], where the pre-
dictions of a “teacher” model (defender’s model) are used
to train a “student” model (attacker’s clone model). We de-
scribe ways in which an attacker can generate synthetic and
surrogate data to perform model stealing attacks.
(a) Synthetic Data: The adversary starts by training
a surrogate model f ′ using a small seed dataset Dseed
of ID examples and iteratively augments this dataset with
synthetic examples. Jacobian-Based Data Augmentation
(JBDA) [17, 9] is one such heuristic for generating syn-
thetic examples. For each input x ∈ D, this method
generates a synthetic example x′, by perturbing it using
the jacobian of the clone model’s loss function: x′ =
x + λsign (∇xL (f ′ (x; θ′))). These synthetic examples
are labeled using the predictions of the defender’s model
y′ = f(x′) and the labeled synthetic examples thus gener-
ated: Dsyn = {x′, y′}, are used to augment the adversary’s
dataset: Dseed = Dseed ∪ Dsyn and retrain f ′.
(b) Surrogate Data: Recent works [15, 21] have shown
that it is possible to use a surrogate distribution Psur(X ′),
which is dissimilar from Pdef (X), to steal the function-
ality of black-box models. The adversary can use inputs
x′ ∼ Psur(X ′) to query the defender’s model and obtain
the prediction probabilities y′ = f(x′). The labeled data
thus obtained: Dsur = {x′, y′}, can be used as the surro-
gate dataset to train the clone-model f ′.
Such methods enable model stealing attacks, despite the
data limitations of the adversary, posing a threat to the con-
fidentiality of the defender’s black-box model.
2.3. Defense Objective
The defender’s aim is to prevent an adversary from be-
ing able to replicate the functionality of the model. Thus
the defender’s objective involves minimizing the accuracy
of the cloned model f ′ trained by the adversary (Eqn. 2).
min E
x∼Pdef (X)
[Acc(f ′(x; θ′))] (2)
The defender is also constrained to provide high classifi-
cation accuracy to benign users of the service in order to
retain the utility of the model for the classification task at
hand. We formalize this by stating that the classification ac-
curacy of the model for in-distribution examples has to be
above a threshold T .
E
x∼Pdef (X)
[Acc(f(x; θ))] ≥ T (3)
Eqn. 2, 3 describe a constrained optimization problem for
the defender. This formulation of the problem allows the
defense to trade off the accuracy of the model for improved
security, as long as the accuracy constraint (Eqn. 3) is satis-
fied. We term defenses that work within these constraints as
accuracy-constrained defenses. Our proposed defense falls
under this framework and allows improvement in security
at the cost of a reduction in classification accuracy.
3. Related Work
We discuss the various defenses against model stealing
attacks that have been proposed in literature. Existing de-
fenses can broadly be categorized into Stateful Detection
Defenses and Perturbation Based Defenses.
3.1. Stateful Detection Defenses
Several works [9, 1] have proposed analyzing the distri-
bution of queries from individual users to classify the user
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as adversarial or benign. For instance, [9] uses the L2 dis-
tance between successive queries to detect adversarial at-
tacks based on the assumption that adversarial users send
highly correlated queries. Unfortunately, such methods re-
quires the defender to maintain a history of past queries lim-
iting scalability. Moreover, these defenses are ineffective
against adaptive attacks, attacks involving multiple collud-
ing adversarial users and attacks that use surrogate datasets,
which do not have correlated queries.
3.2. Perturbation-Based Defenses
In an undefended setting, the attacker has reliable access
to the predictions of the target model f for any arbitrary in-
put x. Perturbation-based defenses modify the original pre-
diction of the model y = f(x; θ) to produce a perturbed pre-
diction y′, preventing the adversary from having reliable ac-
cess to the target model’s predictions. Consequently, train-
ing a clone model with the surrogate dataset: {x, y′} formed
by the adversary results in a low-quality clone model with
reduced accuracy. There are several recent defenses that
work under different constraints for generating perturbed
predictions. They can be broadly categorized into defenses
that preserve the accuracy of the model and defenses that
trade-off accuracy for security. We briefly describe each of
these works before detailing our solution in the following
section.
3.2.1 Accuracy Preserving Defenses
These defenses ensure that the accuracy of the model on ID
examples is unchanged after adding the perturbations. For
instance, [12] constrains the perturbation to leave the top-1
class of the perturbed output unchanged i.e argmax(y′i) =
argmax(yi). This preserves the prediction accuracy of the
model, while removing the information present in the prob-
abilities outputted by the defender’s model. Another de-
fense [21], which works using the same principle, avoids
exposing the output probabilities by only sending the hard
labels of the top-1 or top-K classes while servicing requests.
Both these defenses prevent the adversary from accessing
the true prediction probabilities either implicitly or explic-
itly, while retaining the accuracy of the defender’s model.
Unfortunately, subsequent works have shown that the effec-
tiveness of these defenses are limited as the adversary can
still use the top-1 prediction of the model to perform model
stealing attacks [16].
3.2.2 Accuracy-Constrained Defenses
Unlike accuracy preserving attacks, accuracy-constrained
defenses do not require the classification accuracy to be re-
tained after perturbing the predictions of the model. This
allows the defender to trade off model accuracy for better
security by injecting a larger amount of perturbation to the
predictions of the model. However, the amount of perturba-
tion that can be injected is bound by the accuracy constraint
(Eqn. 3), which ensures that the accuracy of the model is
above a specified threshold for ID examples. Prediction
Poisoning [16] (PP) is a recent work that proposes such
an accuracy-constrained defense, whereby the defender per-
turbs the prediction of the model as shown in Eqn. 4
y′ = (1− α)f(x; θ) + αη (4)
The perturbed output y′ is computed by taking a weighted
average between the predictions of the true model f and a
poisoning probability distribution η. The poisoning distri-
bution η is computed with the objective of mis-training the
adversary’s clone model. This is done by maximizing the
angular deviation between the weight gradients of the per-
turbed prediction with that of the original predictions of the
model. α is a tunable parameter that controls the weigh-
tage given to the poisoned distribution and the true output
of the model. Thus, increasing α allows the defender to
trade off the accuracy of the model for increased security
against model stealing attacks by increasing the amount of
perturbation injected into the model’s original predictions.
4. Our Proposal: Adaptive Misinformation
Our paper proposes Adaptive Misinformation (AM),
an accuracy-constrained defense to protect against model
stealing attacks. Our defense is based on the observation
that existing model stealing attacks generate a large number
of OOD examples to query the defender’s model. This is
because the adversary is data-limited and does not have ac-
cess to a large dataset representative of the defender’s train-
ing dataset. Our defense takes advantage of this observation
by adaptively servicing queries that are OOD with misin-
formation, resulting in most of the attacker’s queries being
serviced with incorrect predictions.
Consequently, a large fraction of the attacker’s dataset
is mislabeled, degrading the classification accuracy of the
clone model trained on this poisoned dataset. Compared to
existing perturbation based defenses like PP, our proposal
has the following distinguishing qualities:
1. AM selectively modifies the predictions only for OOD
queries, leaving the predictions unchanged for ID inputs.
This is in contrast to prior works, which perturb the predic-
tions indiscriminately for all inputs
2. In existing perturbation based defenses, there is a sig-
nificant amount of correlation between and perturbed pre-
diction y′ and the original prediction y, which leaks infor-
mation about the original prediction, that can be exploited
by an adversary (discussed further in Section 5.2.1). In con-
trast, AM ensures that y′ is uncorrelated with y for OOD
queries and therefore avoids leaking information about the
original predictions.
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3. PP requires expensive gradient computations to deter-
mine the perturbations. In contrast, AM has low computa-
tional overheads and just requires evaluation of an auxiliary
misinformation model.
These advantages allow our defense to achieve a bet-
ter trade-off between classification accuracy and security
compared to existing defenses, with a low computational
overhead. Fig. 3 shows the block diagram of our proposed
Adaptive Misinformation defense. In addition to the de-
fender’s model f , there are three components that make up
our defense: (1) An OOD detector (2) A misinformation
function (f ′) (3) A mechanism to gradually switch between
the predictions of f and f ′ depending on the input.
For an input query x, AM first determines if the input
is ID or OOD. If the input is ID, the user is assumed to
be benign and AM uses the predictions of f to service the
request. On the other hand, if x an OOD input, the user is
considered to be malicious and the query is serviced using
the incorrect predictions generated from fˆ . In the remainder
of this section, we explain the different components of our
defense in more detail.
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Figure 3. Adaptive Misinformation: We use an OOD detection
mechanism to selectively service OOD inputs with the predictions
of the misinformation function f ′, while the ID inputs are serviced
with the original predictions of the model f .
4.1. Out of Distribution Detector
Out of Distribution detection is a well-studied problem
in deep learning [6, 10, 13, 11, 23, 3], where the objective is
to determine if an input received by the model during test-
ing is dissimilar to the inputs seen during training. This can
be used to detect and flag anomalous or hard to classify in-
puts which might require further examination or human in-
tervention. A simple proposal to detect OOD examples [6]
involves using the Maximum Softmax Probability (MSP) of
the model. For a model that outputs a set of K output prob-
abilities {yi}Ki=1 for an input x, OOD detection can be done
by thresholding the MSP as shown in Eqn. 5.
Det(x) =
{
ID if maxi(yi) > τ
OOD otherwise
(5)
The idea here is that the model produces confident predic-
tions on ID inputs, similar to the ones seen during training
and less confident predictions on OOD examples that are
dissimilar to the training dataset. Outlier Exposure [7] is a
recent work that improves the performance of the threshold-
based detector by exposing the classifier to an auxilary
dataset of outliers Dout. The model is trained to produce
uniform probability distribution (U) on inputs from Dout
by adding an extra term to the loss function during training
as shown in Eqn. 6.
E(x,y)∼Din [L (f (x) , y)] + λEx′∼Dout [L (f (x′) ,U)] (6)
This ensures that the model produces accurate and confi-
dent predictions for inputs sampled from Din, while OOD
examples produce less confident predictions, improving the
ability of the detector to distinguish them. We train the de-
fender’s model with outlier exposure and use a threshold-
based detector in our defense to perform OOD detection.
4.2. Misinformation Function
For queries which are deemed OOD by the detector, we
want to provide incorrect predictions that are dissimilar to
the predictions of the true model in order to deceive the
adversary. We obtain the incorrect predictions by using a
misinformation function fˆ . We train fˆ by minimizing the
reverse cross entropy loss as shown in Eqn. 7.
min
θˆ
E
(x,y)∼Din
[L((1− fˆ(x; θˆ)), y)] (7)
Minimizing the reverse cross entropy loss trains fˆ to pro-
duce incorrect predictions. We use this model to provide
misleading information to OOD queries, making it harder
for an adversary to train a clone model that obtains high
accuracy on the classification task.
4.3. Adaptively Injecting Misinformation
Finally, we need a mechanism to gradually switch be-
tween the outputs of the defender’s model (f ) and the mis-
information model (fˆ ), depending on whether the input x
is ID or OOD. In order to achieve this, we first pass x
through an OOD detector, which simply requires comput-
ing the maximum softmax probability ymax of all the output
classes produced by f .
ymax = max
i
(yi) (8)
A larger value of ymax indicates that the input is ID, while
a smaller value indicates an OOD input. We use a thresh-
old τ to classify between ID and OOD inputs as shown in
Eqn. 5. The predictions of f and fˆ are combined by using
a reverse sigmoid function S(x) to produce the final output
probabilities y′ as shown in Eqn. 9.
y′ = (1− α)f(x; θ) + (α) fˆ(x; θˆ) (9)
where α = S(ymax − τ) (10)
S(z) =
1
1 + eνz
(11)
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Thus for an ID input, with ymax > τ , we obtain α < 0.5
with y′ → f(x; θ) as α → 0. Similarly, for an OOD input
with ymax < τ , we obtain α > 0.5 with y′ → fˆ(x; θˆ) as
α → 1. ν in Eqn. 11 indicates the growth rate of the sig-
moid. We set ν = 1000 for all of our experiments. Thus,
an adversary accessing the model with OOD inputs obtains
the predictions of f ′ instead of the true predictions of model
f , while inputs from benign users of the service sending ID
queries would be serviced by f . This results in the adver-
sary’s dataset containing examples which have been misla-
beled, leading to a degradation in the accuracy of the clone
model trained on this data.
Security vs Accuracy Trade-off: The OOD detector
has a trade-off between true and false positive rates. In gen-
eral, by lowering the value of the detector threshold τ , we
can increase the number of OOD inputs classified correctly
(true positive rate), which improves security as more OOD
queries are serviced with misinformation. However, this
also results in a higher number of ID inputs misclassified
as OOD (false positive rate), leading to a greater number
of ID inputs being serviced with misinformation, degrading
the accuracy of the defender’s model for benign ID exam-
ples. By appropriately setting the value of τ , the defender
can pick a trade-off point between security and accuracy
that satisfies the accuracy-constraint (Eqn. 3).
5. Experiments
We perform experiments to evaluate our defense against
various model stealing attacks. Additionally, we compare
AP against existing defenses and show that our defense of-
fers better protection against model stealing compared to
prior art. We describe our experimental setup followed by
the results in this section.
5.1. Setup
Our experimental setup involves a defender who hosts
a model f , trained for a specific classification task. The
attacker aims to produce the clone model f ′, which achieves
high classification accuracy on the same classification task.
We briefly describe the classification tasks as well as the
attacks and defenses that we use in our evaluations.
Datasets and model architecture: We focus on vision
based classification tasks using DNNs in our experiments.
Table 1 lists the various datasets and model architectures
used to train the defender’s model f as well as the test ac-
curacy achieved by the models on the corresponding clas-
sification task. As mentioned in section 4.1, we train our
model with outlier exposure [7] to improve the performance
of OOD detection. For this purpose, we use KMNIST [2]
for MNIST and FashionMNIST, ImageNet1k for CIFAR-
10, and Indoor67 [18] for Flowers-17 [14] as the outlier
datasets.
Dataset DNN Architecture Accuracy(%)
MNIST LeNet 99.4
FashionMNIST LeNet 91.47
CIFAR-10 ResNet-18 93.6
Flowers-17 ResNet-18 98.2
Table 1. Datasets and model architectures used to train the de-
fender’s model
Attacks: We evaluate our defense against two represen-
tative model stealing attacks:
1. KnockoffNets [15]: This attack uses surro-
gate data to perform model stealing as described in
section 2.2. We use EMNISTLetters/EMNIST/CIFAR-
100/ImageNet1k as the surrogate datasets to attack the
MNIST/FashionMNIST/CIFAR-10/Flowers-17 models re-
spectively. We assume a query budget of 50000 examples
and train all clone models for 50 epochs.
2. Jacobian-Based Dataset Augmentation (JBDA) [9,
17]: This attack constructs a synthetic dataset by itera-
tively augmenting an initial set of seed examples with per-
turbed examples constructed using the jacobian of the clone
model’s loss function. We use a seed dataset of 150 exam-
ples with 6 rounds of augmentation to construct the adver-
sary’s dataset. Between each augmentation round, the clone
model is trained for 10 epochs and λ is set to 0.1.
To improve the efficacy of the attacks, we use the same
model architecture as the defender’s model to train the clone
model. Additionally, for the ResNet-18 models, we initial-
ize the weights using a network pre-trained on the ImageNet
dataset. We use a learning rate of 0.1 and 0.001 for LeNet
and ResNet-18 models respectively.
Comparison with existing Defenses: Only a small
number of defenses currently exist for model stealing
attacks. We compare our defense against two recent
perturbation-based defenses:
1. Deceptive Perturbation (DP): This is a accuracy-
preserving defense that adds deceptive perturbations to
the predictions of the model but leaves the top-1 class
unchanged[12]. Injecting perturbations removes informa-
tion about prediction probabilities but preserves informa-
tion about the argmax prediction of the model.
2. Prediction Poisoning (PP): This is an accuracy-
constrained defense that perturbs the predictions of the
model with an objective of mistraining the adversary’s clone
model[16]. Increasing the amount of perturbation allows
the defender to trade off the model accuracy for increased
security, similar to our defense.
5.2. Results
Our defense allows the defender to trade off the de-
fender’s model accuracy for increased security against
model stealing attacks by varying the threshold τ of the
OOD detector as described in section 4.3. We measure
6
0 25 50 75 100
Clone Acc. (%) 
0
25
50
75
100
D
ef
en
de
r A
cc
. (
%
) 
MNIST (LeNet)
0 25 50 75 100
Clone Acc. (%) 
0
25
50
75
100
FashionMNIST (LeNet)
Ideal Defense
Undefended
Adaptive Misinformation
Adaptive Misinformation-argmax
Prediction Poisoning
Prediction Poisoning-argmax
Deceptive Perturbations
0 25 50 75 100
Clone Acc. (%) 
0
25
50
75
100
CIFAR10 (ResNet-18)
0 25 50 75 100
Clone Acc. (%) 
0
25
50
75
100
Flowers-17 (ResNet-18)
0 25 50 75 100
Clone Acc. (%) 
0
25
50
75
100
D
ef
en
de
r A
cc
. (
%
) 
MNIST (LeNet)
0 25 50 75 100
Clone Acc. (%) 
0
25
50
75
100
FashionMNIST (LeNet)
0 25 50 75 100
Clone Acc. (%) 
0
25
50
75
100
CIFAR10 (ResNet-18)
0 25 50 75 100
Clone Acc. (%) 
0
25
50
75
100
Flowers-17 (ResNet-18)
(a) KnockoffNets
(b) JBDA
Figure 4. Defender Accuracy vs Clone Accuracy trade-off for defenses evaluated against two attacks: (a) KnockoffNets (b) Jacobian Based
Dataset Augmentation. Perturbation based defenses can improve security (lower clone model accuracy) at the expense of reduced defender
accuracy. Our proposal Adaptive Misinformation offers a better trade-off compared to existing defenses. E.g. in case of Flowers-17 dataset
with KnockoffNets attack, PP achieves a clone accuracy of 63.6% with a defender accuracy of 91.1%. In comparison, AM yields a much
lower clone accuracy of 14.3% (-49.3%) for the same defender accuracy, significantly improving the trade-off compared to PP.
security by the accuracy of the clone model trained using
model stealing attacks, with a lower clone-model accuracy
indicating better security. We plot this trade-off curve of de-
fender’s model accuracy vs clone model accuracy evaluated
against different attacks and show that our defense offers a
better trade-off compared to existing defenses for various
classification tasks.
5.2.1 KnockoffNets Attack
Figure 4a shows the trade-off curve of Adaptive Mis-
information (AM) evaluated against the KnockoffNets at-
tack. Our results show that AM is able to reduce clone
model accuracy significantly, with only a small degrada-
tion in defender model accuracy. Additionally, we compare
our results with the trade-offs offered by two existing de-
fenses: Prediction Poisoning (PP) and Deceptive Perturba-
tions (DP). Note that PP allows a variable amount of pertur-
bation to be added, leading to a trade-off curve whereas DP
has a fixed perturbation leading to a single trade-off point.
We also plot the trade-off points for an ideal defense and an
undefended model for reference.
Comparison with PP: Our results show that for a given
defender accuracy, AM has a lower clone accuracy com-
pared to PP for all datasets, offering a better trade-off be-
tween security and accuracy. For instance, AM lowers
clone accuracy by 49.3% compared to PP with compara-
ble defender accuracy (91.1%) in the case of the Flowers-
17 dataset. We highlight and explain two key differences
between the trade-off curves of AM and PP:
1. For PP, as we increase security (reduce clone model
accuracy), the accuracy of the defender’s model declines
sharply to 0%, while AM retains high defender model ac-
curacy. This is because PP indiscriminately perturbs pre-
dictions for all queries. As the amount of perturbation is in-
creased, the top-1 class of y′ changes to an incorrect class,
leading to a steep drop in the classification accuracy of be-
nign inputs. Our defense avoids this problem by using an
adaptive mechanism that only modifies the probabilities for
OOD queries, allowing ID queries to retain a high classifi-
cation accuracy.
2. For PP, even as the defender accuracy falls to 0%,
the clone accuracy continues to be high (close to 50% for
MNIST and Flowers-17). This is because there is a high
correlation between the original predictions y and the per-
turbed predictions y′. We can quantify the correlations be-
tween y and y′ by using Hellinger distance. We plot the
CDF of Hellinger distance for a LeNet model (trained with
MNIST) under KnockoffNets attack in Fig 5, comparing
AP and PP for the same defender accuracy (92%). We find
that the predictions of PP have lower Hellinger distance in-
dicating a higher correlation with the true predictions of the
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Figure 5. CDF of Hellinger distance between the true prediction y
and poisoned predictions y′, computed for AP and PP for a LeNet
model trained on MNIST under KnockoffNets attack, with com-
parable defender accuracy. The Hellinger distance is larger for AP
compared to PP indicating less correlation between y′ and y
defender’s model. Sending correlated predictions allows the
adversary to learn a clone model with higher accuracy. In
contrast, our defense avoids leaking information about the
predictions of the original model f by switching to the pre-
dictions of the misinformation model fˆ when an OOD input
is encountered. Therefore, by using uncorrelated probabil-
ities to service OOD queries, AP can offer higher security
without severely degrading the defender’s model accuracy.
Comparison with DP: For the DP defense, since the
top-1 class of the model remains unchanged after adding
perturbations, the optimal strategy for the adversary is to
use argmax labels from the perturbed predictions to train
the clone model. Our results show that DP only marginally
improves security compared to an undefended model. In
contrast, our defense is able to lower the clone model ac-
curacy significantly. We also evaluate AP and PP with the
attacker using an argmax-label strategy. We find this strat-
egy to be less effective for the attacker, as it results in a
lower accuracy compared to using the model’s predictions
to train the clone-model.
5.2.2 Jacobian Based Dataset Augmentation Attack
Figure 4b shows the trade-off curve for the JBDA attack.
We find that this attack produces clones with lower accura-
cies compared to the KnockoffNets attack. The results for
the PP defense shows that the defender accuracy quickly
drops to 0%, even as the clone accuracy remains high, simi-
lar to the KnockoffNets attack. Our defense does not suffer
from this problem and offers a better trade-off compared to
PP. Additionally, we find that using the argmax labels of-
fers a better clone model accuracy for this attack depending
on the trade-off point. In this case, AM has a comparable
or slightly better trade-off curve compared to PP. As be-
fore, the security offered by the DP defense is marginally
better than the undefended case, provided the attacker uses
argmax labels to train the clone model.
6. Discussions on Adaptive Attacks
Since security is a two-player game, it is important to
identify and address weaknesses in any defense. In this sec-
tion, we discuss adaptive attacks against our defense and
provide simple solutions that can prevent such attacks.
Can the defense mechanism also be treated as part of
the black box to perform model stealing attack? : Given
infinitely many examples, an adversary would be able to
clone the entire model, including the defense. However, in
order to train a high accuracy clone model with a limited
query budget, the adversary needs to maximize the number
of inputs that get serviced by f . Since our defense returns
the predictions of f only for in-distribution inputs, just a
small fraction of the adversary’s queries (which are mis-
classified as in-distribution by the OOD detector) get ser-
viced by f . In the absence of a way to reliably generate
in-distribution inputs, the adversary would require a much
larger query budget compared to other defenses to reach the
desired level of clone accuracy. Furthermore, this would
expose the adversary to other detection mechanisms. E.g.
a user sending a large fraction of OOD examples can be
blacklisted as an adversarial user.
Can the adversary distinguish when the inputs are
being serviced by f vs fˆ? : One way for an adversary
to improve the quality of the clone model is to identify and
train the clone model only on queries that have been ser-
viced by f i.e. α ≈ 0. For an input to be serviced by
f , it has to be classified as an ID example producing high
MSP on f . Thus, the adversary can potentially use the con-
fidence of the top-1 class as an indication of when the input
is serviced by f . While this can improve the accuracy of the
clone model, the adversary would still need a much larger
query budget since only a small fraction of the adversary’s
queries are serviced by f . Additionally, we can easily pre-
vent such detection by smoothing the posterior probabilities
of f or sharpening the probabilities of fˆ to make the distri-
bution of MSP identical between the outputs of f and fˆ .
7. Conclusion
We propose Adaptive Misinformation to defend against
black-box model stealing attacks in the data-limited set-
ting. We identify that existing model stealing attacks invari-
ably use out of distribution data to query the target model.
Our defense exploits this observation by identifying out
of distribution inputs and selectively servicing such inputs
with incorrect predictions (misinformation). Our evalua-
tions against existing attacks show that AM degrades clone
model accuracy by up to 40% with a minimal impact on
the defender accuracy (< 0.5%). In addition, our defense
has lower computational overhead (< 2×) and significantly
better security vs accuracy trade-off (up to 49.3% reduction
in clone accuracy) compared to existing defenses.
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